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What	Germany’s	grand	coalition	means	for	European
defence	and	security
Following	months	of	coalition	negotiations,	a	new	German	government	has	finally	taken	office.	But	what
does	the	new	government	mean	for	the	EU?	Alessandra	Pozzi	Rocco	writes	that	with	her	next	term	in
power	now	secured,	Merkel	has	the	chance	to	craft	EU	history	further,	notably	by	forging	ahead	on
common	defence	and	security.
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Berlin	has	a	freshly	installed	government	–	at	last.	Six	months	of	coalition	negotiations	reminded	the	28-country	bloc
of	how	central	and	necessary	a	steady	German	leadership	is	for	EU	policymaking.	After	getting	through	several
crises,	the	EU	is	now	seeing	stable	economic	growth	and	a	calmer	political	climate.	But	the	window	of	opportunity	to
push	further	economic	and	political	integration	is	right	before	our	eyes,	and	it	is	up	to	our	leadership	to	seize	this	new
momentum.	Now.
Starting	off	on	the	right	foot,	there	is	great	potential	for	advancement	in	the	field	of	security	and	defence	policy.	Fifty
years	of	slow	and	clumsy	developments	in	this	area	can	now	take	a	new	turn,	and	Germany	has	a	pivotal	role	to	play
in	facilitating	this	process.	There	is	a	good	reason	to	believe	Berlin	will	take	more	decisive	steps	out	of	necessity,	but
with	an	even-handed	approach	with	regards	to	defence,	development	and	cooperation.
The	stars	are	aligning.	The	unique	combination	of	factors	shows	the	time	is	ripe	for	concrete	policy	action.	First,	the
EU’s	security	is	threatened	by	a	wide	array	of	risks:	its	closest	neighbour	turns	out	to	be	a	revisionist	Russia
annexing	Crimea	and	leading	a	proxy	war	in	Eastern	Ukraine	based	on	hybrid	conflict	practices.	The	divisive
Western	public	opinion	over	fake	news	and	the	use	of	energy	supplies	as	a	tool	for	influencing	Ukraine	at	freezing
winter	temperatures	make	eastern	EU	members	highly	concerned,	and	the	neighbourhood	broadly	more	unstable.
Looking	South,	although	ISIS	has	almost	ceased	to	exist,	terrorism	still	proliferates	in	lawless	parts	of	the	MENA
region.	It	is	less	stable	than	ever	and	poses	direct	threats	to	EU	security	through	migration	flows	and	terrorism.	In
2016,	more	than	65	million	people	were	displaced,	fleeing	conflict	around	the	world.	Angela	Merkel	reacted	by	taking
in	one	million	refugees,	but	also	by	allowing	military	steps	that	would	have	been	unthinkable	before	2014:	her
government	has	sent,	for	the	first	time	since	WWII,	lethal	support	into	an	active	conflict	zone.	And	this	has	been	little
remarked	upon	in	the	media,	if	at	all.	It	could	be	considered	as	either	deeply	contradictory	to	Germany’s
pacifist	culture	or	as	a	mindset	evolution	amongst	the	establishment	based	on	the	premise	that	the	German	public
needs	to	be	protected	regardless	of	the	cost.
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Second,	Europeans	always	looked	West	for	support,	friendship	and	partnership	in	addressing	challenges	of	the
future.	Today,	Brussels	hardly	understands	Washington,	which	is	making	relations	as	difficult	as	they	are
unpredictable.	Recent	evolutions	in	EU	foreign	policy	–	notably	the	awakening	of	PESCO	sleeping	beauty
(Permanent	Structured	Cooperation,	included	in	2009	Lisbon	Treaty)	and	the	European	Defence	Fund	–	are	a	direct
consequence	of	three	interrelated	factors.
The	first	is	the	unreliability	of	American	rhetoric	over	the	past	year	on	NATO	–	obsolete	no	longer,	solidarity	if	2%	of
GDP	is	allocated	to	military	spending,	or	unconditional	solidarity	to	its	oldest	and	closest	allies?	Second,	the	strong
concern	of	eastern	capitals,	which	used	to	look	at	NATO	for	protection	and	reject	further	EU	defence	policy	based	on
arguments	of	unnecessary	duplication	is	no	more.	And	third,	the	eternal	veto	to	any	European	development	in
defence	posed	by	London	has	now	disappeared	with	Brexit.
Not	only	have	barriers	been	lifted,	but	a	fresh	wind	of	change	is	blowing	throughout	the	continent	–	a	new	energy
brought	by	a	younger	generation	in	power.	There	come	Emmanuel	Macron,	Charles	Michel,	Marc	Rutte	and	Xavier
Bettel,	with	a	view	to	making	EU	defence	and	security	policy	a	voice	multiplier	for	Europeans	on	the	international
stage.
Angela	Merkel	once	again	took	it	a	step	forward	by	stating	the	EU	needed	to	take	its	future	into	its	own	hands.	Late
February	2018,	Germany’s	Defence	Minister	Ursula	von	der	Leyen	shared	her	view	at	the	London	School	of
Economics	for	more	EU	in	NATO	through	an	army	of	Europeans	in	2025,	one	that	would	be	entirely	integrated,	inter-
operable	and	jointly	commanded	and	could	act	fast.
To	think	that	she	is	leading	the	most	ambitious	reform	of	the	Bundeswehr	to	date	with	these	objectives	in	mind	brings
good	hope	that	her	plan	will	materialise	and	make	Berlin’s	military	capabilities	reliable	for	allies	in	out-of-area
missions.	Bearing	in	mind	that	foreign	policy	is	devised	harmoniously	between	political	leadership	and	expert
networks	in	Berlin	circles,	all	this	translates	into	a	greater	German	readiness	to	act	on	EU	foreign	policy	altogether.
Overall,	most	recent	opinion	polls	(Pew	Research	Centre)	find	the	German	public	to	be	more	concerned	by	security
than	in	the	past,	and	more	receptive	to	EU	action	in	the	field.	However,	surprising	numbers	show	there	is	a	stark
need	for	better	communication	by	the	leadership:	less	than	30%	would	support	a	NATO	intervention	in	helping	an
ally	under	attack.	Germany’s	approach	will	be	a	tailored	one,	reflecting	both	its	culture	and	continued	pressure	from
allies	for	more	responsibility	in	the	field.	Berlin	is	working	to	lead	from	the	middle,	foster	cooperation,	boost	EU
capacities,	facilitate	consensus	and	act	as	framework	nation	for	military	operations.
It	also	walks	a	fine	line	on	the	perception	by	eastern	patterns,	who	fear	a	dominant	Germany	would	bring	back	dark
memories.	In	all,	it	pursues	the	objective	of	making	27	voices	fall	into	one	that	is	heard	and	listened	to	on	the
international	stage	whilst	not	creating	any	competition	to	NATO.	At	last,	it	is	now	also	a	matter	of	legacy	for	Angela
Merkel.	Onto	her	fourth	term,	she	is	in	a	weaker	political	position	but	definitely	still	enjoys	the	trust	and	goodwill	from
key	partners.	As	she	now	does	not	need	to	put	electoral	concerns	at	the	top	of	her	list,	it	is	a	great	time	for	her	to
build	European	history	further.
Detractors	would,	rightfully,	ask	how	much	of	this	is	realistic	if	Germany	still	does	not	increase	its	military	spending	to
meet	the	2%	GDP	NATO	target.	But	sometimes	spending	more	to	get	faster	results	isn’t	the	key	to	success.	Having
structural	blocks	lifted	and	providing	wider	leeway	to	policymaking	is	a	much	more	powerful	change	and	one	that
does	not	happen	that	often.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	A	version	of	this	article	originally	appeared	at	EurActiv.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the
position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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